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The "L-Word": A Short 
History of Liberalism 
by Terence Ball, University of Minnesota 
and Richard Dagger, Arizona State University 
Are these good or bad times for liberalism? On the domestic 
front, after eight years of the Reagan administration and a presi-
dential campaign in which liberalism became "the L-word," they 
seem to be bad times indeed. The same can be said of Margaret 
Thatcher's Britain. But elsewhere, especially in the Communist 
world, events and regimes seem to be moving in a liberal direc-
tion. China after Tiananmen Square presents a notable excep-
tion, of course, but the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe are generally moving towards market econo-
mies and a greater concern for individual rights and liberties-two 
of the hallmarks of liberal societies. 
Hence the question: Are these good or bad times for liberal-
ism? To answer, we shall need a broader perspective than a 
survey of contemporary developments can provide. We shall 
need to look back, that is, to see what liberalism was in order to 
understand what it has become. Only then can we assess its cur-
rent condition and prospects-and appreciate how politics in the 
United States is largely an intramural debate between different 
wings of liberalism. 
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In the Beginning 
Liberalism did not begin as a self-conscious social and political 
movement. This is evident in the fact that "liberal" did not enter 
the vocabulary of politics until the early 1800s, at least a century 
after what we now call liberalism became an important force in 
political thought and action. Like "liberty," "liberal" derives from 
the Latin liber, free, and before the 19th century it was commonly 
used to mean generous or tolerant-an attitude befitting a gentle-
man, much as a "liberal education" was meant to prepare a 
young gentleman for life. Through an extension of this common 
use, "liberal" became a label applied to those who sought a more 
tolerant and open society-a society whose members would be 
free to pursue their own ideas and interests with as little inter-
ference as possible. This first happened in Spain when a faction of 
the Spanish Cortes of 1810-181 I adopted the name Libera/es. 1 
From there the term spread quickly to France and Great Britain, 
where the party known as the Whigs evolved by the 1840s into 
the Liberal Party. 
These self-proclaimed liberals were understandably eager to 
claim descent from prominent political and intellectual figures-
Locke, Montesquieu, and Voltaire, for example-and movements 
such as the Protestant Reformation and the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688. They did this partly in order to gain credibility and sup-
port, a tactic common to political actors of all persuasions, and 
partly to understand the bases of their own beliefs. This meant 
that anyone who had spoken for individual liberty and against the 
various constraints on that liberty had some claim to being a 
liberal, even if he or she could not have used the word in self-
description. This meant, in particular, that the original liberals 
were the people who reacted against two of the characteristic 
features of medieval society in Europe: religious conformity and 
ascribed status. 
Religious conformity was the norm in medieval Europe, where 
church and state were supposed to be partners in the defense of 
Christendom. Indeed, there was no clear distinction between 
church and state at that time, and almost no sense that such a dis-
tinction was worth drawing. For its part, the Christian Church 
saw its mission as saving souls for the kingdom of God-some-
thing that could best be done by teaching and upholding ortho-
doxy, or "correct belief." Those who took an unorthodox view 
of Christianity or rejected it altogether thus threatened the 
Church's attempts to do what it saw as the work and will of God. 
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To enforce conformity to its doctrines, the Church used not only 
its own powers, but called on the secular authorities of Christen-
dom to use theirs. Whether out of religious conviction or a desire 
to r:naintain order in their domains, the secular rules were usually 
willing to suppress those the Church deemed heretics or infidels. 
The other feature of medieval society against which early lib-
erals reacted was ascribed status-the condition in which a per-
son's social standing is based not on one's achievement, but the 
status of one's parents. One was born a noble, a free commoner, 
or a serf; and tha't, with few exceptions, was all there was to it. 
Although ostensibly equal in the eyes of God, men and women of 
different ranks were not equals on God's earth or in man's state. 
The intricate arrangements of feudalism, with its lords, vassals, 
villeins, and serfs, reflected these differences, as did the parlia-
ments or estates-general that began to appear in the late Middle 
Ages. 
Against this society rooted in ascribed status and religious con-
formity, liberalism emerged as the first distinctive political ideol-
ogy. But the liberal reaction did not take form until a series of 
social, economic, and cultural changes shook the medieval order. 
Many of these were directly related to the outburst of creativity 
in the 14th and 15th centuries known as the Renaissance. But 
there was also the Black Death, which took the lives of about 
one-third of Europe's population between 1347 and 1351, 
thereby loosening the medieval social structure and opening new 
opportunities for the survivors. The expansion of commerce in 
the late Middle Ages also played a part, as did the wave of 
exploration set in motion by this commerce. But of all the devel-
opments that contributed to the decline of the medieval order 
and the rise of liberalism, the most important was probably the 
Protestant Reformation. 
When Martin Luther struck the spark that became the Refor-
mation, he meant neither to encourage people to believe and 
worship in whatever way they chose nor to separate church from 
state. Apparently he expected that everyone who read the Bible 
-something he and his colleagues made easier by translating it for 
the first time into German-could only understand it as he did. 
But contrary to Luther's expectations, his proclamation of the 
"priesthood of all believers," with its stress on individual con-
science, opened the floodgates to a variety of interpretations of 
the Bible and a profusion of Protestant sects. Separation of 
church from state followed, as the reformers' challenge to the 
universal authority of the Roman Church gave secular authorities 
an opportunity to expand their power at the Church's expense. 
Thus Henry VIII of England, with the approval of Parliament, cre-
ated a national church with himself at its head. 
The Reformation also provoked a series of bloody wars in 
which contention over religious doctrine led to questions about 
the nature of political authority and obedience. Should a conscien-
tious Christian obey a ruler who tried to enforce conformity to 
doctrines, whether Protestant or Catholic, that the conscientious 
person took to be wrong? Both Luther and Calvin said, with some 
qualifications, that one must disobey but not resist such a ruler, 
for all rulers derive their power from God. Later, however, some 
of Calvin's followers concluded not only that resistance is some-
times justified, but that the people have a right to overthrow 
rulers who deny them freedom of religion. By this they meant 
everyone's freedom to practice Calvinism, to be sure. Yet their 
arguments for freedom of conscience, resting in part on the claim 
that government receives its authority indirectly from God 
through the consent of the people, planted the seeds of the argu-
ment in favor of religious toleration. 2 
Without intending to do so, then, the Protestant reformers 
prepared the way for liberalism. By teaching that salvation comes 
through faith alone, Luther and the other reformers encouraged 
people to value the individual conscience more than the preserva-
tion of unity and orthodoxy. From individual conscience to indi-
continued on page 3 
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vidual liberty was still a radical step for the time, but .it was a step 
that liberals took in the 17th and 18th centuries. For 1n those cen-
turies liberalism emerged as an attempt to free individual.s from 
the constraints of religious conformity and ascribed status 1n soci-
ety-an attempt, that is, to work a fundamental transformation 
of society. 
Liberalism and Revolution 
It is no accident that the 17th and I 8th centuries are associated 
with revolutions as well as with the emergence of liberalism. In 
fact, "revolution" entered the vocabulary of politics in 17th cen-
tury England, when it was borrowed from astronomy to re.fer to 
a return, or revolving back, to an earlier pos1t1on or cond1t1on. 3 
By the time of the French Revolution, however, "revolution" 
suggested something new and bold-a thorough transformation 
of an entire social order. Liberal ideas helped to 1nsp1re this revo-
lution, just as they did the more modest revolutions in England 
and its North American colonies. 
The revolution in England occurred in two acts, as it were, 
beginning with the civil war of the 1640s. Pen and ink played as 
great a part in this war as bullets and sword. From every point of 
view came a vast outpouring of pamphlets, treatises, sermons, 
and even major works of political theory. Among the latt~r was 
the first book of philosophical significance to bear the d1st1nct1ve 
stamp of liberalism, Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan ( 1651 ). 
Hobbes's conclusions, of course, were anything but liberal. For 
the sake of security, he argued, the people of a commonwealth 
grant the sovereign absolute power, retaining only the right to de-
fend themselves when the sovereign threatens them with "death, 
wounds, or imprisonment." What gives Hobbes's theory the 
stamp of liberalism is not his conclusion, however, but his prem-
ises. Individuals are equals, on Hobbes's account, and everyone 
has a natural right to be free; but in order to protect their inter-
ests, individuals consent to create and obey government. In these 
respects, Hobbes's position is very much that of a liberal. But it 
remained for John Locke to use these premises to reach a conclu-
sion that we may definitely regard as liberal. 
The reaction against both religious conformity and ascribed 
status is clear in Locke's work of the 1680s, the period of the 
second act of the English revolution. In his Letter Concerning 
Toleration ( 1689) Locke maintained that it is wron.g for govern-
ments to force their subjects to conform to a particular religion. 
Drawing a distinction between private and public matters, Locke 
said that religion is normally a private concern and not, therefore, 
a proper subject for government interference. Governments can-
not save souls, for this can come only through 1nd1v1dual belief. 
Unless the practice of a religion directly threatens the public 
order, then, government must allow the adherents of any rel.i~ion 
to worship as they see fit. For Locke, this meant that Catholicism 
and atheism should not be tolerated. Catholics owe their first 
loyalty to a foreign monarch, the pope, so they cannot be trust-
worthy members of a commonwealth; nor can atheists, for a~y­
one who denies the existence of God, salvation, and damnation 
cannot be trusted at all. But Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and the 
Puritan sects-the groups who figured so prominently in the 
religious and political upheaval of 17th century England-must 
learn not only to stop trying to enforce conformity.to their views 
on their fellow citizens, but also to tolerate any religion that con-
fined its practice to the private sphere. 
Complementing his work on toleration was Locke's Two Treat-
ises of Government ( 1690). Published in the afterma.th of the Glori-
ous Revolution but written, for the most part, during the early or 
mid-I 680s, the Two Treatises inquired into the foundations of 
political authority. In the Second Treatise, Locke proceede.d from 
premises very similar to Hobbes's, yet reached a very different 
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conclusion. Both denied that social status is somehow fixed or 
ascribed by nature, and both believed that government is 
founded on the consent of the people; but Locke believed that 
people can only consent. to create and obey a limited or constitu-
tional government. To give anyone absolute power over our lives 
would be both irrational and contrary to the will of God. Both 
Hobbes and Locke also believed that people have natural rights; 
but for Locke this included not merely a right to self-defense, but 
rights to life, liberty, and property. These, in turn, provided the 
basis for a right of revolution-a right that would be invoked four 
score and six years after the publication of the Two Treatises in the 
Declaration of Independence of the United States. 
Long considered a prime example of Lockean liberalism, the 
character and provenance of the Declaration of Independence is 
now a matter of scholarly dispute. 4 But there is no doubt that the 
argument of the Declaration, as well as some of its striking 
phrases, closely resembles Locke's. This, perhaps more than the 
"truths" Jefferson declaims, is self-evident: 
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.-That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their JUSt powers 
from the consent of the governed.-That whenever any Form of 
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the 
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, ... 
Not only the Declaration, but Thomas Paine's Common Sense 
( 1776) provide compressed versions of Locke's argument-an 
argument that Jefferson later said merely represented ''the com-
mon sense of the matter .... " 5 Two features of this "common 
sense'' view deserve particular attention. The first is the claim 
that "all men are created equal, ... " This caused some em-
barrassment when the Declaration was issued, for a number of 
colonists, "patriots" as well as "tories," pointed out the hypoc-
risy of proclaiming the equality of all mankind while cont1nu1ng the 
practice of slavery. 6 The source of this embarrassment was 1n fact 
a general problem in the position of the early liberals. For they 
spoke a democratic language when they said that all men are 
naturally free and equal and that government rests on the con-
sent of the people; yet they never explained whom they counted 
as "men" or "the people." By making these claims, however, the 
early liberals at least provided an opening for those who could 
say-as Mary Wollstonecraft and others soon did-if all men are 
created equal, why isn't this or that group of men or women 
being treated as equals? 
The second feature of Jefferson's "common sense" view that 
deserves special attention is his defense of the ri~hts a~d liberties 
of individuals against governments. This again .1s typical of. th~ 
early liberals, who saw government as a cont1nu1ng threat to 1~d1-
vidual liberty. But it also betrays the influence of the classical 
republican theorists, such as Machiavelli and James Harrington, 
who warned against the danger of corruption. Republicanism and 
liberalism are difficult to sort out at this point (and others), but 
there were differences of emphasis. The republicans worried 
about the corruption of the people as much as the corruption of 
the government, whil~ the early liberals were concerned almost 
exclusively with the abuse of power by the government. More-
over, the republicans looked upon freedom as mostly a matter of 
governing oneself through political participation, and therefore 
closely connected with civic virtue; but on the liberal view free-
dom was more a matter of being free from interference by the 
government, and virtue something to be learned and practiced in 
private life. 
This heady mixture of republican and liberal thought not only 
served to justify the independence of the United States, but to 
provide the philosophical basis for its constitution as well. At th.e 
same time the constitution was taking effect, furthermore, this 
mixture was inspiring a truly revolutionary upheaval in France .. To 
understand the part that liberalism played 1n this revolution, 1t 1s 
continued on page 4 
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necessary to remember three important characteristics of the 
ancien regime that the revolution attacked: religious conformity, 
aristocratic privilege, and absolute rule. Locke had argued against 
all three in his writings, and the French philosophes followed him in 
attacking at least the first two. When the Revolution came, how-
ever, all three were condemned as contrary to reason and rights. 
In the National Assembly's Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen ( 1789), the first article dismisses aristocratic privilege 
and ascribed status with the assertion, "Men are born, and 
always continue, free and equal in respect of their rights. Civil dis-
tinctions, therefore, can be founded only on public utility." The 
second article proclaims ''the natural and imprescriptible rights of 
man" to "liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppres-
sion," and the third says that the "nation" is the "source of all 
sovereignty," which entails that no one can "be entitled to any 
authority that is not expressly derived from it." So much for 
absolute rule. Nor did the Declaration spare religious conformity, 
declaring in the tenth article that "No man ought to be molested 
on account of his opinions, not even on account of his religious 
opinions, provided his avowal of them does not disturb the public 
order established by the law" (emphasis in original). 
In all these respects, the French Revolution began as an attempt 
to transform France into a liberal society. To many historians, and 
not only Marxists, this has meant that the Revolution was prin-
cipally an uprising of the bourgeoisie, for it was the bourgeoisie in 
particular that resented the opportunities denied them by aristo-
cratic privilege. They wanted a society open to talent and 
achievement, where a man might prove his worth through com-
petition, including economic competition. 
Economic opportunity was especially important to the mer-
chants, bankers, lawyers, and professional people who composed 
the bourgeoisie or middle class, in France and elsewhere, for 
acquiring wealth was practically the only way they could improve 
their social position. But in the Middle Ages and the early modern 
period in Europe there were numerous restrictions on manufac-
turing and commerce, such as the traditional Christian ban on 
usury and a host of national and local regulations concerning 
working conditions and the production, distribution, and sale 
of goods. In the 17th and 18th centuries, there were new re-
strictions associated with the prevailing economic theory, . 
mercantilism. 
In their efforts to remove obstacles to individual liberty, many 
liberals began to argue that economic exchanges are essentially a 
private matter between persons who are pursuing profits. This 
emphasis on private profit ran against the grain of much of the 
Christian and republican traditions, neither of which assigned 
much value to either privacy or profits. But the 1700s produced 
some forceful statements of the argument that people ought to 
be free to pursue their private interests-Bernard Mandeville's 
Fable of the Bees ( 1714), for instance, and the French physiocrats, 
who summarized their views in the phrase, Laissez faire, laissez 
passer.'' Capitalism found its most thorough and influential 
defense, however, in Adam Smith's Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations ( 1776). Smith argued for an eco-
nomic policy that would allow individuals to compete freely in the 
marketplace. He saw this as the fairest policy, since it gives every-
one an equal opportunity, as well as the most efficient and most 
conducive to the public interest. For there is nothing like self-
interest to lead people to provide the goods and services that 
others want. As Smith put it, "It is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, 
but from their regard to their own interest. We address our-
selves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk 
to them of our own necessities but of their advantage" (Book I, 
Chapter II). 
Throughout the 18th century, then, liberalism proved a revolu-
tionary doctrine, one that was reshaping the religious, political, 
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social and economic relations of people in Europe and North 
America. It continued to play this part in the 19th century, inspir-
ing revolutions in South America as well as Europe, and consoli-
dating its strength in England and the United States. And in 
England in particular, the theoretical development of liberalism 
took new directions. 
Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century 
Perhaps the best way to characterize these new directions is to 
say that 1'.he liberal attitude toward democracy and government 
changed during the 19th century. Where earlier liberals had 
spoken the language of equality, that is, liberal thinkers of 19th 
century England took the further step of calling for expansions of 
the franchise; and where earlier liberals regarded government as, 
in Paine's words, a "necessary evil," some in the 19th century 
came to see it as a necessary ally in the struggle to promote indi-
vidual liberty. In both cases, Utilitarianism in general and John 
Stuart Mill in particular played vital parts. 
Jeremy Bentham, the original leader of the Philosophic Radicals, 
or Utilitarians, died in 1832, the year of the Reform Bill that 
extended the vote to England's middle-class males. Bentham had 
worked for the passage of this bill, but he preferred a more 
democratic franchise-a vote for all men, and perhaps (he was 
not firm on this point) for all women, too. He came to this view 
slowly, led by his commitment to the principle of utility. As Ben-
tham saw it, "Nature has placed mankind under the governance 
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone 
to determine what we ought to do, as well as what we shall do.' '7 
Anything, then, that helps us to avoid pain or achieve pleasure 
has utility and helps to make us happy. But the things that give 
utility are scarce, and some people's pleasures come at the 
expense of pain to others, which means that we must have a prin-
ciple to tell us how to act when a conflict of interest arises. That 
principle, Bentham said, is the principle of utility-do whatever 
will promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number-and 
it is the "business of governmer·t to promote the happiness of 
society, by punishing and rewarding. " 8 
Bentham drew two general conclusions from this. The first was 
that in most cases government could best promote the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number by leaving people alone. The 
individual is usually the best judge of his or her own interests, he 
said, so government should usually let people pursue their inter-
ests as they see fit. The second conclusion was that government is 
not likely to effect the happiness of society if it is open to only a 
portion of the people. In the pursuit of utility, Bentham declared, 
everyone is to count equally. The government must take every-
one's utility into account, and it can do this only if everyone, or 
almost everyone, is allowed to vote. 
Bentham and his associate, James Mill, occasionally qualified 
their enthusiasm for a democratic franchise-Mill once suggested 
that denying the vote to women, men under 40, and the poorest 
one-third of the population would still allow for full representa-
tion of social interests-but they were nevertheless in the van-
guard in their day. Mill's son, John Stuart Mill, pressed the point in 
the mid- I 800s. A staunch supporter of women's rights, including 
the right to vote, Mill called for adult suffrage. Yet in his case, too, 
there were qualifications, the most significant being the scheme of 
plural voting he advanced in Considerations on Representative Gov-
ernment ( 1861 ). There Mill recommended representative democ-
racy as the best possible form of government by appealing to the 
elevating qualities of political participation. Political participation 
exercises the mental and moral faculties, he claimed, and thus 
promotes intelligence, discipline, and devotion to the public inter-
est. If society is to derive the most benefit from this exercise, it 
must extend the right to political participation to almost all adult 
citizens. Yet it would be foolish to entrust everyone, the ignorant 
continued on page 5 
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and unenlightened as well as the informed and public-spirited, 
with an equal voice in public deliberations. Almost every man and 
woman should have a vote, therefore, but those with higher 
levels of education and intellectually more demanding occupations 
should have two, three, or more. 
Mill's ambivalence toward democracy probably derives from 
his fear of the ''tyranny of the majority,'' a fear he expressed to 
lasting effect in On Liberty ( 1859). In that much-debated essay Mill 
expressed his alarm at what he took to be a new threat to liberty. 
Now that government is responsible to the people, he said, or at 
least to those who vote, the majority of voters can use legal coer-
cion to deny liberty to those who do not share their views. More 
directly, the "moral coercion of public opinion" can and does 
stifie freedom of thought and action by making social outcasts of 
individuals who do not conform to social customs and beliefs. 
Against this new tyranny, Mill proposed "one very simple prin-
ciple": "the only purpose for which power can be exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others." He defended this principle-the so-called 
"harm principle"-by appealing not to natural rights, but to util-
ity. Freedom is a good thing, he argued, because both individuals 
and society as a whole will benefit if people are encouraged to 
think and act freely. For the individual, freedom is as vital to per-
sonal development as food is to physical survival. It is always 
possible, of course, that people who speak and act freely will 
make others uncomfortable or unhappy. But in the long run this 
works to the benefit of society, too. For progress is possible only 
where there is an open competition among different opinions and 
beliefs-a marketplace of ideas. 
Mill's defense of liberty took a form familiar to earlier liberals. It 
rests on a distinction between private (or self-regarding) and 
public (or other-regarding) matters, for instance, and suggests 
that individual liberty must be protected from interference by 
government and society. There was another dimension to Mill's 
view of liberty, however, and it marked a shift in the attitude of 
many liberals toward government. Although Mill defined freedom 
in On Liberty as the absence of restraint, his emphasis on the 
growth and development of the individual person has more in 
common with Aristotle than with Bentham. For freedom, as Mill 
conceived it, is largely a matter of being free to realize one's 
potential. In some of Mill's later work, and especially in the writ-
ings of T. H. Green and the English Idealists, this conception of 
freedom suggested that government could and should be some-
thing more than a nightwatchman protecting the life, liberty, and 
property of the citizen. 
Green couched this argument in terms of a distinction between 
negative and positive liberty. There is a sense, he said, in which 
freedom is merely the absence of restraint. But it has a positive 
dimension, too, a sense in which freedom is the positive power or 
ability to do something. Thus we may say that a child born into 
poverty, with no real opportunity to escape, is not truly free to 
grow and develop to the full extent of his or her abilities. But if 
we admit this, anyone who values individual liberty will want to 
take steps to overcome those circumstances-poverty, ignor-
ance, illness, and prejudice among them-that pose such for-
midable obstacles to positive freedom. And this means that 
society, acting through government, should take steps to pro-
mote the welfare of its people-and do so in the name of indi-
vidual liberty. 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries a number of scholars 
and political figures adopted and extended these views, leading to 
a sharp split between these "welfare" or "reform" liberals, on 
the one hand, and their "neoclassical liberal" rivals, on the other. 
In the late 1800s neoclassical liberalism found its most prominent 
expression in the Social Darwinism of such writers as Herbert 
Spencer and William Graham Sumner. As the franchise expanded 
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to include the working class, however, and the welfare state 
began to emerge, neoclassical liberalism began to fade. In the 
industrial world, moreover, the days of the entrepreneur seemed 
to have given way to the days of the corporation, the trust, the 
syndicate and conglomerate. Business was now "big business," 
and many people began to call for government intervention in the 
marketplace not to restrict competition, but to keep the large 
corporations from choking it off. Under the impetus of these 
developments, welfare liberalism came gradually to be known 
simply as liberalism. 
Liberalism Today 
This is not to say that neoclassical liberalism ever entirely dis-
appeared, for some economists (e.g., Friedrich Hayek and Milton 
Friedman) and at least one novelist (Ayn Rand) continued to press 
the case against active government and the welfare state in their 
writings. In the 1970s and '80s, furthermore, neoclassical liberal-
ism has enjoyed a revival. The emergence of the Libertarian Party 
is one sign of this revival, as is the admiration for "free market" 
policies so evident in the Thatcher and Reagan governments. Yet 
another is the philosophical respectability won for neoclasical 
views by Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia ( 1974). 
Still, welfare liberalism remains the stronger branch as we enter 
the last decade of the 20th century. The Libertarian Party has had 
little success at the polls, and neither Thatcher nor Reagan has dis-
mantled the welfare state. As for philosophical respectability, 
John Rawls's A Theory of justice ( 1971) has given welfare liberalism 
a powerful theoretical statement at least as influential as Nozick's. 
It is possible, of course, that welfare liberalism is the stronger 
branch of a weak or dying tree. George Bush's presidential cam-
paign, with his repeated references to Michael Dukakis as a "big-
spending liberal" and an "ultra-liberal," suggests that this is the 
case. For all his attempts to turn "liberal" into "the L-word," 
however, Bush, like most Republicans, is a liberal, albeit one who 
seems unable to decide whether he prefers the welfare or neo-
classical camp. If he appears to be a conservative, it is largely 
because the established way of life that our conservatives want to 
preserve is itself rooted in liberalism. And if he appears to be a 
pragmatic politician who is above or beyond ideology, it is 
because liberalism is so deeply rooted in American thought as to 
seem, as Jefferson said, "the common sense of the subject .... " 
So it is that political debate in the United States is largely an 
intramural contest between different wings of liberalism, with the 
welfare liberals dominant. Yet there seems little chance that they 
will overwhelm or absorb their neoclassical rivals. On the con-
trary, there is some reason to believe that the differences be-
tween the two factions may grow sharper. To this point the two 
have agreed on ends-a society in which individuals have an equal 
opportunity to choose and pursue their goals freely-but dis-
agreed on the best means to achieve them-an active govern-
ment or a nightwatchman state. But if welfare liberalism continues 
to move in a more egalitarian direction, as Rawls and others sug-
gest it should, this disagreement over means may look more and 
more like a disagreement over ends. Add to this the changes 
underway in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and we may 
have the beginning of a shift in ideological alignments, with welfare 
liberalism and various forms of socialism merging into something 
that might be called social democracy, on the one hand, and 
opposing an alliance of neoclassical liberals and conservatives, on 
the other. 
Whether this does or does not happen, two general conclu-
sions can be drawn about the current state of liberalism. The first 
is that liberalism is not the revolutionary force it once was. Or not 
in the West, at any rate. For the liberal attack on ascribed status, 
religious conformity, or political absolutism still strikes at the foun-
dations of society in some parts of the world. This is most evident 
in Iran and other countries of the Middle East, where liberalism 
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may have provoked a reactionary response from Islamic funda-
mentalists. In Eastern Europe and Asia, moreover, various pro-
tests against Communist forms of ascribed status and political 
absolutism claim "liberalization" as their goal. In the Western 
world, however, the aims of the early liberals are now deeply 
entrenched in public policy and public opinion. In these places lib-
eralism is no longer a revolutionary ideology, but an ideology 
defending a revolution already won. 
A second conclusion is that liberals are now wrestling with two 
extremely difficult problems-problems that are difficult partly 
because they stem from liberals' basic commitments to individual 
liberty and equality of opportunity. The first is, how far should in-
dividuals be able to go in exercising their freedom? Most liberals, 
welfare and neoclassical alike, accept something like Mill's harm 
principle. When it comes time to apply the principle, however, 
the difficulty of deciding what harms someone becomes clear. 
Many liberals say that such "victimless crimes" as prostitution, 
gambling, and the sale of pornography should not be crimes at all. 
Others respond that these crimes are not as "victimless" as they 
appear. So the argument continues without resolution. Despite 
their desire to separate the area of private freedom from the 
area of public control, then, liberals have found the boundary be-
tween private and public impossible to draw with any precision. 
The second problem grows out of the liberal commitment to 
equal opportunity. For the neoclassical liberal, this means simply 
that everyone ought to be free to make his or her way in the 
world without unfair discrimination. The liberal should then see to 
it that discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender-of 
anything other than talent and ability-is illegal. Most welfare lib-
erals want to take the matter further, however. They claim that 
government ought to take steps to help disadvantaged people 
enjoy an equal opportunity in life. But how far should this go? 
Should we try to bring about a more nearly equal distribution of 
wealth and resources, as Rawls suggests, in order to promote 
true equality of opportunity? Is this fair to those who have earned 
their wealth, as Nozick maintains, without violating the rights of 
others? Should we endorse affirmative action programs in order.· 
to compensate women and members of racial minority groups 
for the discrimination they have suffered in the past? But aren't 
these way~ of discriminating against some people by discriminat-
ing in favor of others? Can this be justified in the name of equality 
of opportunity? 
These questions are especially troublesome for liberals because 
they are the kinds of questions liberalism leads people to raise. So 
whether one thinks these good or bad times for liberalism is likely 
to depend on how he or she reacts to the current inability of 
liberals to provide satisfactory answers to these questions. Some 
may see this as a serious or even fatal weakness-a sign that lib-
eralism is lost or exhausted, at the end of its rope. A more sym-
pathetic response might be to say that liberalism is still doing what 
it has always done-searching for ways to advance the cause of 
individual liberty and opportunity. Certainly anyone who shares 
Mill's belief that flexing our mental and moral muscles is vital to 
individual growth will find plenty of room for exercise-and con-
clude that these may be good times indeed for liberalism. 
Note 
*Thanks to Jack Crittenden for comments on an earlier draft. Portions 
of this article are drawn from Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, Political 
Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (New York: Harper & Row, forth-
coming). 
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